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Background: The uncontrolled presence of African swine fever (ASF) in Russian Federation (RF) poses a serious risk
to the whole European Union (EU) pig industry. Although trade of pigs and their products is banned since the
official notification in June 2007, the potential introduction of ASF virus (ASFV) may occur by other routes, which
are very frequent in ASF, and more difficult to control, such as contaminated waste or infected vehicles. This study
was intended to estimate the risk of ASFV introduction into the EU through three types of transport routes:
returning trucks, waste from international ships and waste from international planes, which will be referred here
as transport-associated routes (TAR). Since no detailed and official information was available for these routes,
a semi-quantitative model based on the weighted combination of risk factors was developed to estimate the risk
of ASFV introduction by TAR. Relative weights for combination of different risk factors as well as validation of the
model results were obtained by an expert opinion elicitation.
Results: Model results indicate that the relative risk for ASFV introduction through TAR in most of the EU countries
(16) is low, although some countries, specifically Poland and Lithuania, concentrate high levels of risk, the returning
trucks route being the analyzed TAR that currently poses the highest risk for ASFV introduction into the EU. The
spatial distribution of the risk of ASFV introduction varies importantly between the analyzed introduction routes.
Results also highlight the need to increase the awareness and precautions for ASF prevention, particularly ensuring
truck disinfection, to minimize the potential risk of entrance into the EU.
Conclusions: This study presents the first assessment of ASF introduction into the EU through TAR. The innovative
model developed here could be used in data scarce situations for estimating the relative risk associated to each
EU country. This simple methodology provides a rapid and easy to interpret results on risk that may be used for a
target and cost-effective allocation of resources to prevent disease introduction.
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African swine fever (ASF) is one of the most devastating
diseases of swine due to the high mortality caused (mainly
in the hyper-acute and acute forms of the disease), the ab-
sence of effective vaccine, and the severe trade restrictions
associated with its presence in the affected areas. ASF is
caused by the infection of ASF virus (ASFV) which is trans-
mitted by direct contact with fluids and excretions from
infected animals. Blood, widely present in hyper-acute and
acute forms of the disease, is considered the major route of
direct transmission, containing high titers of virus for long
lasting periods [1]. Other common ways of ASFV infection
are the bites of infected ticks, and the indirect contact with
various contaminated fomites and pig products, where
ASFV remains infectious for long periods. As an example,
ASFV infectivity persists more than 1000 days in frozen
meat [2], 15 weeks in putrefied blood stored at room
temperature [3] and one month in contaminated pig pens
[4]. This long ASFV persistence explains that the introduc-
tion of contaminated pork meat or other pig products from
international transports and, its eventual use to feed pigs, is
one of the most frequents ways for ASFV introduction into
free territories. For example, this route has been hypothe-
sized to be the way of introduction in Europe, specifically in
Portugal in 1957, in the Caribbean sea (Cuba) in 1971, in
South America (Brazil) in 1978, Belgium in 1985 or, re-
cently, in Georgia in 2007 [5].
Other fomites (e.g. vehicles, animal feed, veterinarians
or contaminated material) have been also identified as
important routes for pig diseases introduction/spread
into free-territories [6]. In fact, returning trucks have
been identified as one of the most important ways of
spread of diseases such as classical swine fever (CSF) by
studies performed in Denmark and The Netherlands
[7,8]. Unfortunately, the risk associated to this route is
not easy to be quantified, mainly because of the lack of
detailed information and the need to estimate large
number of parameters which increases the complexity
and uncertainty of the models to be used. Some studies
have assessed the introduction of some animal diseases
through returning trucks in specific regions or countries
[7,8] or through illegal meat [9]. Other were aimed to
estimate the exposure of susceptible populations to swill
or catering waste (e.g. [10-12]) in countries such as Den-
mark, The Netherlands, United States of America or
United Kingdom. Even, recently published studies
addressed the risk of ASFV introduction by imports of
pigs [13]. However, to the best of the author´s know-
ledge, no studies have assessed the risk of ASFV intro-
duction through transport-associated routes (TAR) in
the whole European Union (EU).
After the introduction in Georgia in 2007, the spread
of ASFV into Trans Caucasian countries (TCC) and
Russian Federation (RF) territories has caused more than200 notifications, with more than 120000 animals culled
in the area [14]. Currently, ASFV spread is not con-
trolled within RF, with continuous occurrence of out-
breaks. Moreover, some of those outbreaks have been
notified in very distant regions (>2500 km) from the
initial outbreaks and are close (<150 km) to the EU bor-
ders [15]. In response to this situation, the EU author-
ities carried out some scientific studies to estimate the
risk of ASFV introduction into the EU [16], which high-
lighted the need for the proper disinfection of returning
livestock vehicles coming from affected areas [17].
Considering i) the severe sanitary and economic im-
pact of ASF in the affected territories, ii) the current
situation out of control in RF [15]; iii) the closeness of
some ASFV outbreaks to the EU borders and iv) the
evident concern of the EU authorities regarding the risk
associated with returning trucks [17], it was considered
valuable to estimate the potential risk of ASFV introduc-
tion into the EU by TAR. The semi-quantitative model
presented here provides a simple and transparent
method to interpret results, identifying the most critical
TAR for each country and ranking the countries based
on their relative risk for ASFV introduction.
Methods
The study presented here was aimed to estimate
what the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
guidelines of risk analysis referred to as “release or entry
assessment” [18] for the three TAR analyzed. As we have
no information and detailed data regarding the subse-
quent infection associated with contaminated trucks and
with the potential illegal use of waste for animal feeding
purposes for each of the 27 EU countries, exposure
assessment was not evaluated in this work.
In collaboration with the Veterinary Epidemiology and
Public Health group from the Royal Veterinary College
(RVC) a semi-quantitative risk assessment model was
developed to estimate the risk of ASFV introduction by
the selected routes, using the combination of principles
from the knowledge driven spatial models [19] and
expert opinion elicitation methods previously used in
other animal health risk assessments [20,21]. Risk factors
related with the risk of ASFV introduction by each route
were selected based on literature review. Information for
these risk factors was gathered and further combined
weighting their importance by expert opinion (EO) to
obtain the relative risk for each country by each route.
Consequently, this study was structured in three con-
secutive steps: (1) risk pathways definition, (2) likelihood
estimation, and, (3) sensitivity analysis.
Risk pathways definition
The goal of the study was to estimate the spatial vari-
ation of the risk of ASFV introduction into the EU
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for ASFV entrance in each specific country. Based on
historical data, current awareness and previous works
[16] about ASF risk of introduction into EU, three TAR
were considered in the model. The first one was referred
as returning trucks and was intended to measure the
probability of ASFV introduction into the EU by poten-
tially contaminated livestock vehicles (i.e.. trucks) com-
ing from affected areas. The second TAR was the waste
disposal from international ships, which historically, has
been one of the most important ways for ASFV intro-
duction into free areas. The third TAR was the waste
from international planes.
Likelihood estimation
An intensive literature review was performed to select
and collect information about the risk factors that could
be used to estimate the risk of ASFV introduction by
each of the considered TAR pathways. Those risk fac-
tors, for which complete, reliable and updated data was
available for all the EU countries, were selected for the
model calculations. Sources of data, main assumptions
and uncertainty associated to each of these risk factors
have been summarized in Table 1.
The risk associated with returning trucks was esti-
mated using three risk factors which were: (1) number
of pig exports toASF-affected countries (i.e RF and
TCC) (2) number of road border cross points with non
EU countries (except borders with Switzerland, Lichten-
stein and Norway) and (3) proportion of returning
trucks not being properly disinfected. This last risk fac-
tor was defined using three different scenarios that allow
the evaluation of the effect of preventive measures (i.e.
high, medium and low percentage of truck disinfection)
on the final risk values. For final calculations, medium
scenario proportion of truck not properly disinfected
was selected for all the countries.
In order to estimate the risk associated with waste dis-
posal from international ships, we used the volume of
goods and number of persons transported by different
types of ships as an indicator of the volume of the
potential contaminated products arriving by ships to the
EU. For the purpose here, only movements coming from
ASF-infected countries were considered for the analysis.
Particularly, four different types of ship movements were
considered, based on EUROSTAT official classification.
The first type is cargo ships, which includes all type of
ships for transporting goods. The second type is passen-
ger ships, which includes ferries and other boats used
for human transportation, excluding cruises. Short sea
shipping (SSS) is the third type of ships, which includes
movements of goods within small seas. Specifically here,
only movements in Baltic and Black sea were consid-
ered, as they are surrounded by ASF infected countries.The fourth and final type of boat is cruises, particularly,
only cruisers with at least one call in an ASF-infected
country (African countries and RF) were considered in
the analysis.
Similar to boat waste estimation, the number of com-
mercial flights coming from ASF-affected areas was
selected as risk factor for the volume of potential ASF-
contaminated waste arriving by plane to the EU.
Risk factor standardization
Country data for each risk factor was obtained and fur-
ther standardized into the same comparable scale to
allow their comparison and further combination. Specif-
ically, for each risk factor, data values of all the EU coun-
tries were transformed into six categories based on
country data distribution. These categories are based on
Natural Breaks of the data countries values for the spe-
cific risk factor, further adjusted using the Jenks
optimization method of ArcGIS 9.3 (ESRI) [26]. For each
RF, countries values were transformed into values from
0 to 5. For each category, a risk level was assigned, con-
sidering the following ranking: negligible (0); very low
(>0 - ≤1); low (>1- ≤2); medium (>2 - ≤3); high (>3 -
≤4); very high (>4).
Expert opinion elicitation
Final results for each TAR were obtained by the
weighted combination of the risk factor categories. To
estimate the importance and consequent weight for each
risk factor and route, an EO panel session was per-
formed in Lisbon, September 23rd 2011, during the
ASFRISK symposium. EO elicitation process have been
widely used in many fields (engineering, sciences, social
or medical research among others) to deal with uncer-
tainties and gather information on parameters not for-
mally described in literature. These methods are based
on the opinions or judgments of experts in the specific
field to be covered [27]. In this case, the group of
experts included twenty-three international experts, with
wide experience on animal health risk management,
including three CVOs from EU countries, eight repre-
sentatives from EU CVOs, and representatives from
FAO, OIE, DG SANCO and Russian Agriculture Minis-
try, and highly experienced researchers in ASF.
The selected methodology for developing the EO ses-
sions was a Delphi modified method, similarly to those
used by Gale et al. and Gallagher et al. in previous
works. Following basic steps of Delphi method, first of
all, experts were given an introduction about the goal of
the risk assessment, the structure and risk factors of the
model, as well as the instructions for voting. Each expert
was given an electronic remote control device associated
with an interactive presentation. This system guarantees
the anonymity of the votes and enables the on time
Table 1 Description of the risk factors used in the model for ASFV introduction into EU by TAR
Name Risk factors Parameter to be estimated Data source Assumptions Uncertainty
P1 Number of live pigs exported
from EU to ASF-affected countries
by road
Number of potential ASF
contaminated returning trucks
[22]
(Nov. 2007–2009)
Only pig exports to TCC and RF were
considered.
Other type of trucks could also get
in contact with ASFV in affected areas;
however the most probable is that a
pig truck enters into a farm.
It was assumed that trucks that export
live pigs may enter into a farm and
potentially become contaminated
with ASFV.
P2 Number of the roads crossing
EU national boundaries with
non-EU states
Number of ways (and consequently,
facility) of a truck to arrive by road
to an EU country from non-EU
countries.
[23] Borders with all non-EU member states
were included except members of the
European Free Trade Association
(Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Norway).
Other factors such as cultural relations,
effectiveness and quality of controls or
topography, were not considered.
It was assumed that higher number of
cross border points, implies higher
number of connections, and consequently
easier to share trucks movements.
P3 Three scenarios were used to
approximate the proportion of
returning trucks not properly
disinfected
Returning trucks not properly
disinfected
[7] Despite disinfection of returning trucks
from ASF affected areas is mandatory,
this measure is not always 100% effective.
As no field data is available related with
efficiency of this measure, common
scenarios were used for the 27 EU
countries. If known, differences between
countries may be simulated within the
model by the selection of different
scenarios in each country.
For the best scenario, a 5% of returning
trucks not properly disinfected was
assumed, 15% for the medium scenario,
and 25% for the worst case scenario.
P4 Inward number of cargo ships
from ASF-infected countries
to EU ports
Potential ASF-contaminated waste
introduced by cargo ships
[22]; [14] Imports of goods were considered
without differences between products.
More volume of goods implies more
waste.
Catering used in the cargo ship not
necessary comes from the departure
country.
P5 Inward number of passenger
ships coming from ASF-infected
countries to EU
Potential ASF-contaminated waste
introduced by passenger ships
(excluding cruises)
[22]; [14] More passengers imply more catering
and consequently, more waste.
Passenger ships not always have catering
and do not imply that food comes from
origin countries.
P6 Short sea shipping (SSS) ships
coming from ASF-infected
countries to EU
Potential ASF-contaminated waste
introduced by SSS movements
[22]; GIS Volume of goods transported by SSS
movements by Baltic and Black sea.
Only two sea regions were considered as
potential risk for ASF introduction
(Baltic and Black sea).
Higher volume of transported products
not always implies higher number of
crew on the boat and consequently
higher volume of catering and food
brought from origin countries.
P7 Proportion of cruise ships
coming from ASF-affected areas
by country
Potential ASF-contaminated waste
introduced by cruises
P7 ¼ CAi
Cp=p½  Assuming that these cruises bringcatering food from departure or call
countries.
A potential stop in an affected country
does not always imply use of food from
this country.
Unknown origin of cruise catering
increase uncertainty of this measure.
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Table 1 Description of the risk factors used in the model for ASFV introduction into EU by TAR (Continued)
CA Number of cruise ships arriving at
EU ports after one stop in
ASF-infected areas.
[24] Assuming a similar number of cruises
and origins in the different years.
Data from one year to another may
change
Cp Number of cruise passengers
arriving at EU ports (Cp)
[22] Data from one year to another may
change
P Average number of passenger by
cruise ship was used to estimate
number of cruisers (P)
[25] Assuming a similar number of passengers
by cruise.
Different types of cruises with different
capacities could affect the final
estimation
P8 Commercial passenger flights
from ASF-infected countries to
EU airports
Potential contaminated waste
introduced by international
passenger flights
[22];[14] It was assumed that commercial flights
from affected areas could potentially bring
food from origin countries. The higher the
number of flights from ASF-infected
countries, the higher the risk of using ASF
contaminated products.
Unknown origin of the catering increase
uncertainty of this measure.
Detailed data about assumptions, uncertainties and data source of each risk factor used in the model was included in the table.
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Figure 1 Distribution of the relative risk for ASFV introduction into the EU by transport-associated routes.
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ments about them on the same session.
During the EO session, experts answered ten closed
questions with a number of possible answers, for the
comparison of the importance of each risk factor by
route and within routes. The results of the EO were
combined assigning equal weights to all the experts,
which allows to obtain the weights by RF and route.
These weights were computed using the percentage of
votes that considered each RF/route as the highest risk
for ASFV introduction.
Combining the results
Once all the weights were obtained by EO and each risk
factor value was standardized, both were combined in
order to obtain the relative risk of ASF introduction intoFigure 2 Relative risk of ASFV introduction by returning trucks when
were used to approximate the proportion number of returning trucks not
and c) 25% (worst scenario).the EU by TAR (RRTAR). The way to combine these risk
factor values (numerical values) was a linear weighted
model, similar to those used in the knowledge driven
models [19], using the weights obtained during the EO
elicitation. The detailed explanation of this combination
is described in the following formulas:
RRTAR ¼
Xn
i¼1
0:65ðR:T½ Þ þ 0:24ðW:SÞ þ 0:11ðW:P Þ
RRTAR ¼
Xn
i¼1
h
0:65 0:33P1iþ 0:33P2iþ 0:33P3ið Þ
þ0:24 0:33P4iþ 0:42P5iþ 0:24P6ið
þ0:01P7iÞ þ 0:11P8i
i
where n is the number of countries evaluated for ASF-
TAR risk in the EU, R.T. is the risk value for returningconsidering three different scenarios. Three different scenarios
properly disinfected a) 5% (best scenario), b) 15% (medium scenario)
Figure 3 Relative risk of ASFV introduction into EU by waste from international ships.
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waste disposal from ships and planes, respectively. The
second formula disaggregates the routes by risk factors
used for its calculations, which definitions, data sources
and uncertainties are explained in Table 1.
The final risk values were translated into qualitative
results, following the same risk categories explained be-
fore, to facilitate the comprehension of the results.Figure 4 Relative risk of ASFV introduction into EU by waste from car
waste from cargo ships are represented with detail of the origin and destin
countries (b).Sensitivity analysis
All weights used in the model were analyzed in the sen-
sitivity analysis (SA) by the 25% increase and decrease
from their initial values, considering twenty different SA
scenarios. Results obtained in each of these twenty SA
scenarios were compared with the results obtained in
the reference model (Figure 1). Correlation between
results of these scenarios and the reference results wasgo ships. Results for the relative risk of ASFV introduction into EU by
ation of imports coming from Africa (a) and European ASF-infected
Figure 5 Relative risk of ASFV introduction into EU by waste from international flights. EU airports are shown in green dots graduated by
the volume of extra-EU flights coming from ASF affected areas.
Mur et al. BMC Veterinary Research 2012, 8:149 Page 8 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/8/149calculated by using the Spearman correlation coefficient
(Rho) calculated with R-language (v. 2.14.1, R Founda-
tion for Statistical Computing, Vienna, 2010). Addition-
ally, the number of countries changing their risk
category in the SA scenarios was represented.
All results were represented using choropleth maps
with ArcGIS 9.3.1 (ESRI).
Results
Most of the EU countries (16 over 27) presented a low
level of risk for ASFV introduction by TAR (RRTAR).Figure 6 Correlation between sensitivity analysis scenarios changing
number of countries that changed their risk category in the different scenaThe minimum risk (0.53) was located in Malta and the
maximum risk (3.52) in Poland. The countries at highest
risk were Poland and Lithuania followed by Finland,
Estonia and Germany, with medium risk (Figure 1).
The highest risk for ASF introduction was associated
with returning trucks, accounting for the 65% of the
total TAR risk. In the scenario with medium proportion
of disinfected trucks, Poland had an estimated very high
risk (Figure. 2) followed by Lithuania with high risk, and
Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Romania, with medium risk,
being all of them neighboring countries to currentrisk factor weights (+− 25%) and the reference model results. The
rios is represented near the line.
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of disinfection of trucks meaningfully changes risk
categories, from level two (low risk) in the case of
Romania for the best-case scenario, to level four (high
risk) in the worst-case scenario.
Waste from international ships was the second most
relevant pathway in terms of risk. Risk map for this
pathway (Figure 3) highlighted Finland with a very high
risk, followed by several countries with a medium risk.
Nevertheless, some countries concentrated very high risk
of ASFV introduction associated to specific types of
ships. For movements of passengers, considered as the
most important type of ship movements by EO, only
Finland and Poland registered movements from ASF
affected areas, concentrating a very high and medium
risk, respectively. In the case of cargo ships, the second
most important boat type, four countries concentrated a
very high level of risk (Figure 4). The detailed analysis of
this type of movements revealed that the main origin
of these cargo ships movements was RF, followed
by Nigeria and Angola, however different patterns of
risk were found among destination countries. For SSS
movements, four countries surrounding the Baltic sea
(Denmark, Finland, Lithuania and Sweden) as well as
Bulgaria in the Black sea, concentrated very high levels
of risk. For cruise movements only five North European
countries concentrated very high risk levels, although
the relative importance of this type of movements was
considered low by EO.
Finally, waste from international planes was the path-
way posing highest risk for United Kingdom, France and
Germany (Figure 5). The main EU airports are repre-
sented in Figure 5 using graduated symbols based on the
number of extra-EU commercial flights received from
ASF-affected countries.
SA revealed that the model is robust. The lowest
correlation coefficient obtained between the reference
scenario and each of the different SA scenarios was
Rho = 0.97 (p < 0.01) (Figure 6). Analyzing the impact
that changes in inputs had on the country risk category,
none of the countries experienced a change greater than
one category. All these findings revealed that substantial
changes of 25% in the initial weight values do not mean-
ingfully affect final risk results.
Discussion
This is the first study aimed to assess the risk of
ASFV introduction into the EU associated to TAR.
Current presence of the disease without control in
areas of RF close to the EU borders, together with
results of the EFSA advise [16], other studies [28] and
recent published legislation [17], point out the im-
portance that illegal trade and other potential path-
ways such as transport fomites may have in the ASFVintroduction into the EU, which remarks the import-
ance of the study here.
However, the estimation of TAR is not a simple task.
Vehicles and waste from international means of trans-
port have been frequently suggested as a potential route
for disease spread, specifically for ASFV introduction
into free areas [29,30]; but no studies have quantified
this risk. The lack of information for these TAR does not
allow to use traditional risk assessment models making
necessary to develop alternative approaches to analyze
the risk of ASFV introduction by these pathways. The
methodology proposed here combines methods used in
the knowledge driven models used for spatial modeling
of diseases [19] as well as methods for the risk estima-
tion based on expert opinion elicitation [20,21]. More-
over, we used available data on risk factors, conveniently
standardized, weighted by EO and linearly combined (as
done in spatial modeling), to estimate the relative risk of
TAR in the different EU countries. Although results
should be cautiously interpreted considering all the
assumptions and uncertainties associated with the model
structure and data used, the approach is believed to
be useful to evaluate the TAR risk. This study was
specifically performed considering the selected routes of
entrance, and, importantly, the specific characteristics
of the pathogen, for the risk tended to be estimated. For
example, the long survival of ASFV in all kind of meat and
infected products allows to measure the risk based on
potential incoming volumes of infected material, without
considering the survival time of the virus on it. However,
when adapting the methodology presented here for other
animal diseases or routes of entrance, this important fea-
ture, as well as many other specific characteristics and
parameters, should be modified conveniently to incorpor-
ate the features of the disease under study.
One of the most important aspects to be considered
is that the model does not provide probabilities, but com-
pares the relative risk between the 27 EU countries based
on the risk factors evaluated. Indeed, a high value on the
model results does not imply an absolute high level of risk,
but a higher one compared with other EU members. On
the other hand, the selection of information for each of
the risk factors used in the model is influenced by the
quality and availability of data sources for the 27 EU coun-
tries. For example, the degree of cleaning of returning
trucks is based on scenario rather than real data due to
the absence of this data for each of the EU countries.
Therefore the results presented here depend on the
quality and reliability of this data. It is important to
consider also that the model only estimates the risk
of entrance/release of potential ASFV-contaminated
material/transports, but does not consider the subse-
quent exposure of the susceptible livestock population
in the destination country.
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weights obtained by EO for combination of risk factor
and pathways. EO process is a valuable method widely
use when no other “more objective” information is
available (i.e. literature, etc.) and particularly for the esti-
mation of complex parameters or parameters with sig-
nificant uncertainties, as some of the presented in this
study. Particularly, Delphi approach is one of the most
frequently used methods of EO that originally does not
allow for interaction between the experts [27]. However,
in this study small modifications were made by the little
interaction between experts during the results presenta-
tion and the use of electronic devices for voting. This
technique implies many advantages, being an adequate
way to collect information for solving problems. How-
ever, the lack of universal guidelines or standardized
procedures for its performance could arrive into difficul-
ties that should be cautiously considered [31]. Some pro-
blems of the technique could be derived from the
inappropriate selection of the experts, the lack of previ-
ous information, the inadequate performance of the
questionnaire or the combination of the results. Never-
theless, this method may provide a more realistic and
updated view of the scenarios under evaluation, in this
case related with ASF risk, based on the experts valuable
experience. Moreover, and because weights used in the
weighted combination of the risk factor are a critical as-
pect of the model, an intensive SA was performed in
order to identify the impact of these estimated weights
in the final results. This SA reveals that the model is
robust and do not significantly change when changing
the weights provided by EO. In fact, none of the coun-
tries changed more than one category in the different
SA scenarios evaluated. For example, the 25% decrease
on the weight of returning trucks, which is the scenario
with lowest correlation coefficient (Rho = 0.97), affected
categories of seven countries. Most of them (three coun-
tries) changed from low to very low risk, two decreased
from medium to low risk, and two from high to medium
risk. These changes result in a very similar risk map, but
with a slight difference of risk category in these coun-
tries, which confirms the robustness of the model.
At the same time, the use of different scenarios in
some of the measured parameters allows Animal Health
(AH) Authorities in each EU country to have the possi-
bility to select the scenario that more realistically repre-
sents their current situation based on their expert
opinion. For example, we are providing three different
results based on certain assumptions, but AH Author-
ities may consider that for their countries only the sce-
nario one is realistic, so they will have the possibility to
select it and visualize the correspondent outputs. This
flexibility, as well as, the easy update and the possibility
of incorporation of more detailed information (ifavailable for some countries) instead of being considered
a limitation, is considered as one of the main strengths
of the model.
Model results reveal that the median of the risk values
for ASFV by TAR in the 27 EU countries is low (for 16
of the 27 EU countries), although big differences were
found between countries and pathways. An expected
result of the model is that EU countries closer to RF and
TCC borders are the ones at higher risk for ASFV intro-
duction by TAR, being Lithuania and Poland the coun-
tries at higher risk for ASFV entrance, followed by
Finland, Estonia and Germany. Returning trucks is the
TAR at highest risk for ASFV introduction into the UE,
being almost three and six times more important than
waste from ships and planes, respectively. This result is in
agreement with the EU commission risk perception which
recently approved a legislation [17] that strengthen and
remind the importance of cleaning and disinfection for
returning livestock vehicles coming from affected areas.
In fact, the differences found in the results of the three
scenarios for the disinfection of trucks (Figure 2) high-
light the importance of that measure in preventing the
entrance of animal diseases into free territories. On the
other hand, ships waste has two times higher risk than
plane waste. Ships waste has been recently suggested as
the origin of the outbreaks in the Caucasus region [5],
which may have influenced the opinion of the experts
regarding their weights. Again we should highlight that
the risk associated to ships and planes waste would de-
pend not only on the release in the EU country, but on
the final exposure, or contact, with susceptible popula-
tions, and this fact has not been measured on this work.
The analysis in detail of the results obtained for the
different countries and the different analyzed pathways
give us a better characterization of the risk. For example,
in the case of Lithuania, although it has an overall high
risk of ASF introduction by TAR, this risk is mostly
associated to trucks, but not to waste from international
ships or planes. These results are certainly influenced by
the geographic location of the country, close to the
current affected area, and the intense commercial rela-
tions with RF, which has been demonstrated by the
amount of pig exports to this country. The opposite case
is Germany that resulted in a medium risk for the over-
all TAR, but only a very low level for returning trucks.
In this case the presence of most of the EU airports
(50%, five over ten) that receive large number of flights
from ASF-affected countries [22] determines the high
level of risk associated to waste from planes. Similarly,
Germany is a very important country in maritime trade
(cargo ships, SSS and cruises) which explains also the
high risk associated to waste from ships. Other countries
with high risk associated to waste from planes are
France and United Kingdom, where the two most
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from ASF-affected countries (Charles de Gaulle and
Heathrow, respectively) are located (Figure 5).
Another interesting result is related with the big differ-
ences found among the different ship types. Although
Finland is the unique country that concentrates an aver-
age very high risk for waste from ships pathway, other
countries are only highlighted when a specific type of
ship movements is analyzed. For example, Bulgaria has
an estimated very high risk by SSS movements through
Black sea, particularly associated with the port of Burgas,
the second most important port in the Black sea [32].
Several countries surrounding the Baltic sea (Denmark,
Finland, Lithuania or Sweden among others) are also
highlighted in SSS movements and cruises, mainly due
to their geographical closeness and trade with RF.
However, the most interesting results are related with
waste from cargo ships, for which, four countries con-
centrate very high risk (France, Italy, the Netherlands
and Spain). The detailed analysis of these movements,
considering origin and EU destination ports, reveals
some interesting differences among these countries. For
example, in Netherlands, the risk both from RF as well
as from Africa (mainly from Angola and Nigeria) is par-
ticularly concentrated in the port of Rotterdam, the one
that receives the biggest amount of potentially risky
cargo ships (those coming from ASF-affected countries)
in the EU. However, in Spain the risk is more distribu-
ted, with two important ports receiving high number of
cargo ships from Africa and other two from RF. In this
particular case, these countries with the same level of
risk present different profiles with one or several import-
ant ports in terms of risk. This fact enhances the import-
ance of the detailed analysis of these results (represented
in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5) that could be much more in-
formative to the policy makers than the general overview
of the results (Figure 1).
Authors believe that this model has an important lo-
gical and biological approach as its results reflect areas
and pathways identified at high risk by experts. This
kind of models built using a simple and easy to under-
stand methodology, are faster to develop and easier to
interpret compared with the quantitative ones, and are
particularly suitable when few information is available.
For this reason this model may be considered as an ad-
equate alternative in data scarce situations to provide a
scientific support to risk managers, and ultimately, to
prevent animal diseases introduction in free territories.
Conclusions
We developed a semi-quantitative new risk assessment
approach to estimate the relative risk for ASFV into each
EU country associated with TAR. The absence of avail-
able data for this pathway and the complexity of theestimations due to the huge uncertainties associated,
lead us to develop a semi-quantitative model based on
the use of risk factors as risk estimators. The results of
the model indicate that the median risk of ASF introduc-
tion in EU countries is low and mainly associated to
returning trucks, although some countries concentrate
higher levels of risk such as Poland and Lithuania. Meth-
ods and results of this study may help to allocate surveil-
lance and other risk reduction measures to prevent or
minimize the potential impact of ASF introduction into
the EU.
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